Since many organizational measures of performance come without ready-made definitions of what performance level is acceptable, organizations may have different aspiration levels depending on their history and the attention patterns of their members, so the same performance level might be evaluated differently in different organizations. Whether a given performance level is categorized as a success or a failure is consequential, because the value function used to judge performance is not a smooth function of the level of performance but, rather, decreases more quickly in the failure range (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The simplified information processing obtained by categorizing outcomes as successes and failures means that organizational risk taking could be highly sensitive to performance relative to the aspiration level. Social and historical aspiration levels. If performance relative to aspiration levels is important, then we ought to study how aspiration levels are formed. Social comparison theory suggests that aspiration levels are determined by the performance of similar others (Festinger, 1954; Cyert and March, 1963) . People compare themselves with referent others either for self-assessment or self-enhancement (Wood, 1989) . When the goal of social comparison is to make an accurate assessment, others who are diagnostic because they are similar to the focal actor are included in the reference group, but when the goal is self-enhancement, high-performing others may be removed from the reference group. The situation can also determine the referents by making a group of (possibly unwanted) others highly salient (Wood, 1989). There is less research on social comparison among organizations, so we know little about how managers form reference groups of other organizations. Size, industry, and performance are important organizational characteristics that seem to affect reference group composition (Haveman, 1993; Davis and Greve, 1997), and within an industry similarity judgment may also be based on product, market, or production methods of the firms (Reger and Huff, 1993; Porac et al., 1995). As in individual social comparison, salience may be so important that opportunities to edit the reference group by relevance or self-enhancement criteria are limited. Physical proximity is important in the composition of reference groups (Baum and Lant, 1993), reflecting its importance as a relevance criterion or simple ease of observation. A second theory of aspiration levels is that they are determined by the performance history of the firm itself (Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 1981). The recent performance history of the organization can be used to set an aspiration level that holds differences among organizations constant. Aspiration levels based on historical performance have been related to early, and hence high-risk, firm entry into research and development consortia (Bolton, 1993), changes in organizational strategy in both stable and changing environments (Lant, Milliken, and Batra, 1992), and decisions in a simulated market (Lant, 1992) . Lant (1992) also argued that the processes of expectation formation and aspiration formation are similar and that studies of adaptive learning of expectations indicate that historical data are used to form aspirations (e.g., Jacobs and Jones, 1980; Sterman, 1987).
Social and historical aspiration levels can be seen as results of the decision maker behaving as an intuitive scientist (Nisbett and Ross, 1980): available data are combined with simple processing rules to create an expectation of future performance, which then becomes the aspiration level (Meyer and Gellatly, 1988) . When the recent performance of other organizations in the market are used to form an expectation, the proximity in time makes bias due to temporal changes in the market unlikely, but the selection of referents can introduce bias. When the performance history of the same organization is used to form an expectation, heterogeneity among organizations is not a problem, but changes in the market situation over time can lead to bias. Judging performance by historical and social aspiration levels is a decision-making heuristic, but it resembles more formal ways of forming expectations.
From relative performance to risk taking. Scholars have proposed different functional forms of the relationship of performance relative to an aspiration level and the probability of organizational change (e.g., March and Shapira, 1992), and figure 1 illustrates some of them. Figure la shows a very simple model that assumes that decision makers classify outcomes into two categories, success and failure, and that the probability of change is higher in the failure category (March and Simon, 1958). Figures 1 b-d show models with continuous adjustments of the probability of change. In figure 1 b the probability of change decreases as the performance increases, but in the success range (above the aspiration level) the probability decreases faster than in the failure range (below the aspiration level). Probability of change may decrease more slowly below the aspiration level because of the decision makers' commitment to failing courses of action (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981), perceptual and attributional biases (Milliken and Lant, 1991), or preferences for the status quo (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In figure ic these inertial factors are absent, leading to a constant decrease in the probability of change over the entire range of performance. In figure 1c, aspiration levels would not be necessary to explain the probability of change, since there is no discontinuity or change in slope anywhere in the function. Finally, in figure id change is most likely near the aspiration level and declines away from it. Such a relation might happen if obvious failure produced rigidity in the organization, while outcomes that cannot be easily classified as successes or failures allow political contests over the interpretation of performance, leading to new political coalitions and subsequent change (Ocasio, 1995).
The curve in figure 1 b is characterized by two properties: (1) decline in the probability of change as performance increases, both in the negative and positive range of relative performance; and (2) higher sensitivity above the aspiration level, as the decline in probability of change is greater when relative performance is positive. The first of these properties incorporates the idea that failure increases the probability of change by initiating search activities (Cyert and March, 1963) and by making the future performance levels that might result from a change more attractive relative to the present. 
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The hypotheses assume that the social and historical aspiration levels affect the probability of change by the functional form shown in figure 1 b. The social aspiration level is based on the contemporary performance of a reference group of organizations. Here, the reference group is all other organizations in a market, specified according to industry convention, and the aspiration level is set to their mean performance. Clearly, the composition of the reference group and the rule for integrating their performance into an aspiration level can be specified differently, but these choices seem like a good start for investigating the effects of a socially constructed aspiration level. The hypotheses are:
Hypothesis la (Hia): When performance relative to the social aspiration level increases, the probability of change decreases.
Hypothesis lb (Hib): The decrease in the probability of change is greater for performance increases above the social aspiration level.
The historical aspiration level gradually accommodates to the current performance of the firm. This is done by specifying it as an exponentially weighted moving average of experienced performance (Levinthal and March, 1981; March, 1988; Lant, 1992) . Defining the symbols A for aspiration level, P for performance, t for time period, and so for an adjustment parameter, the formula is:
This formulation of the historical aspiration level can be viewed as the result of an anchoring and adjustment process (Schneider, 1992), with last period's aspiration level as the anchor and this period's performance as the adjustment. The so is the weight given to the performance, and high so means that the aspiration level is updated quickly, implying an emphasis on the recent performance. The model's premise that previous aspiration levels and performance affect the aspiration level is supported by experimental and field studies, but the functional form of the effects is still debated (Lant, 1992; Mezias, Chen, and Murphy, 1997). The hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): When performance relative to the historical aspiration level increases, the probability of change decreases.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The decrease in the probability of change is greater for performance increases above the historical aspiration level.
Modifications of received theory. The theory of responses to performance feedback contains some ambiguous or disputed points, and it is important to discuss how this paper differs from others. First, some treatments assume that the historical and social aspirations are integrated into one aspiration level (i. Momentum at the organization level may be caused by responses to performance feedback rather than routinization of changes. In a highly competitive environment it is difficult to find a market position that gives high performance relative to a social aspiration level. In an environment with increasing competition it is difficult to find a market position that gives high performance relative to a historical aspiration level. This can lead low-performing firms to change, but they find that performance after the change is still low and then change again. If performance alone predicted change, analysis of the effect of change on the probability of subsequent change would produce a momentum effect when performance measures were omitted, but it would produce none once performance measures were included. If performance and momentum effects were both present, the effect of change on the probability of subsequent change would be smaller when performance measures were included. Empirical work on momentum typically has not included performance measures (Amburgey and Miner, 1992; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993), so it is not clear whether performance feedback can account for some or all of the momentum effect.
I tested the hypotheses using data on the format changes of U.S. radio stations. Radio broadcasting is a fruitful setting for testing effects of performance measures because audience estimates are a shared and very important performance measure for radio stations. Audience estimates are scrutinized by a station's top manager, programming manager, and salespeople and are used to guide decisions on programming, advertising rates and targeted advertisers, and format changes. Because the competition (and audience measurement) in radio broadcasting is local to each market, it is possible to use data on multiple markets to get variation in social aspiration levels across observations. Because data are available over time, it is possible to trace the effect of performance relative to historical aspiration levels. The decision to change the format has serious and uncertain consequences for the station's economic performance, so it is an appropriate outcome for a study informed by the theory of risk-taking behavior.
The Radio Broadcasting Industry
Radio markets are differentiated because audiences differ in tastes for music and other programming material. standard error and possible bias (Apel, 1992) , the consequences are just as serious as if they had been entirely accurate. They are presented to advertisers to justify advertising rates and sell advertising spots, in effect becoming real sources of revenue for the station. In an interview, a program director referred to the audience measures (informally called ratings) as a "report card" and then noted their significance for station revenue: "Nine times out of ten, if you have good ratings, you can charge good rates for your commercials, sell lots of commercials, and bring in as much revenue as possible. And the only source of revenue that radio stations have is advertising." Commercial radio stations are owned by private persons, small joint stock companies, schools and religious orders, large broadcast corporations, and divisions of media corporations or diversified corporations.1 A single radio station is not a large business, so a corporation that wants a large investment in the radio industry will own several. To control for the effect of performance above one aspiration level but below another, the models include a negative inconsistency variable, which is set to zero if the performance is over or under both aspiration levels and is set to the difference of the performance and the highest aspiration level if the performance is between the two aspiration levels. If a self-enhancing rule is in operation, the effect of performance below one aspiration level will be reduced when the other aspiration level is below the performance level. The negative coefficient of the relative performance will then become closer to zero, which means that the negative inconsistency variable will have a positive coefficient estimate.5
Change measures. To test hypotheses 3 and 4, I specified four variables as counts of changes observed or experienced by the station. I tested H3a by a count of the station's format changes during the past two years (station change, local), and H3b by a count of the format changes made by the other stations in the focal corporation during the previous two years (station change, nonlocal). I tested H4a by a count of the format changes by other stations in the local market in the previous year (market change, local), and H4b by a count of all format changes in markets in which the focal corporation had stations, except changes in the focal market and by its own stations (market change, nonlocal). The market change variables test how information about opportunities affect change, so I only added recent events; the station and corporate change variables test how capabilities affect change, so I used a two-year span to capture a longer period of buildup and retention. Two variables control for differences in change behavior among stations owned by different size corporations. The first is just an indicator variable showing whether the station was owned by a multimarket corporation, defined as an entity owning three or more stations. The variable station number is the number of stations owned by the station's corporation. Finally, I attempted to control for the absolute level of performance of the station by including the variable share -market size. This is the station's share of the audience multiplied by the total radio advertising revenue in the market (estimated by Duncan, 1992) and serves as a proxy for the advertising revenue collected by the station. It is only a proxy, because the same audience share can have different values to advertisers depending on their listening habits and on demographic characteristics related to their buying power.
Model
The outcome is the binary variable (no change or change) at a specific time. The structure of the dependent variables would in principle allow continuous-time event-history analysis, as the timing of format changes was measured to the nearest week. The key independent variables are annual audience measurements, however, formed as an average of the spring and fall ratings books for markets surveyed at least twice a year and as the spring ratings book for markets surveyed only once a year (Duncan, 1992). Since continuoustime methods assume that independent variables are updated exactly when they change, the effect of these inde-
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The SAS Probit/logit routine is specified as the probability of no event [i.e., P(Y = 0)] (SAS Institute, 1989: 1326), which causes the coefficient signs to be opposite of the usual specification, but I reversed them to normal when I entered them into the tables. Risky Change pendent variables are better estimated by discrete-time analysis. The analysis was done using a logit model predicting format change in a given year with last year's performance and current market conditions as independent variables. Stations sometimes had more than one format change in a year, but this was too rare to justify models of the count of events in a time period. The estimation was done by the Probit/logit routine in SAS, and the coefficient significance was tested by the Wald tests supplied by this routine (SAS Institute, 1989: 1335).6
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics are shown in table 1. The variables using historical aspiration levels differ depending on the updating constant at, so each level of a has its own correlation table. Here the table for a = 0.1 is shown, as it is the value used in the subsequent tables. The correlations do not differ substantially for different levels of a. The table shows high correlations in some places, such as between number of stations and multimarket corporations and nonlocal changes. Except for these variables, which may be estimated with less precision as a result of the correlations, the table does not suggest any data problems. Table 2 shows a comparison of different models of the all changes event. Model 1 does not have any performance variables and suggests that stations with many competitors are more likely to change their format, while stations owned by multimarket corporations are less likely to do so. Model 2 adds share x market size and share adjusted by social and historical aspiration levels. The results are quite intuitive; high performance on any measure reduces the probability of a format change. As the log likelihood test shows, this model greatly improves on model 1. Model 3 tests the predictions for the social and historical aspiration levels. The coefficients for share -average share support Hla: they are negative both above and below zero, so the probability of change is declining as the performance relative to the social aspiration level increases. The change at zero coefficient is the difference between the slopes above and below zero, and it shows that the negative slope above zero becomes less steep below zero but remains negative (i.e., -.207 + .147 = -.061). Results support Hlb, as the change below zero is positive and significant, showing the expected increase in sensitivity above the zero point. For the historical aspiration level, the coefficients are also significant in the predicted direction, supporting H2a and 2b. The relation between relative performance and change appears to be as in figure 1 b for both the social and historical aspiration levels. The log likelihood test shows a statistically significant improvement over model 2. Model 4 adds the negative inconsistency variable to test for endogenous shift of attention. The coefficient estimate is positive, consistent with a self-enhancing rule, but only significant at the .10 level. Model 5 adds variables that test H3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b. Observation of changes in the market appears to facilitate change in the station, as H3a stated, and recent experience with change also predicts change, as H4a stated. The finding that figure 2 , the probability of change clearly declines as the performance relative to the historical aspiration level increases, and it declines more rapidly above the aspiration level. The range is from a probability of .153 down to .043. If the station had covariate values that gave it a greater probability of changing (such as having many competitors or recently experienced change) these probabilities would increase, but the shape of the function would remain the same. When the performance is below the historical aspiration level but above the social aspiration level, the inconsistent aspiration levels appear to lead to a lower increase in the probability of change, as the dotted line shows, but this difference is not significant in the model. to the social aspiration level is stronger. This is surprising, given the earlier arguments on self-enhancing social comparison, which would lead to less sensitivity to this aspiration level, and suggests that managers of low-performing radio stations are unable to define their comparison groups selectively to exclude high-performing stations. The apparent lower responsiveness to performance below the social aspiration level when the aspiration levels are inconsistent is suggestive, but not statistically significant. Perfomance -Aspiration more than one type during one year. For them, both types of events are included, so the total number of partitioned events is 2,170-30 more than the number of all changes.
The model of new format shows mostly the same results as the all-changes model, but one difference is that the change in slope below the social aspiration level is so great that performance changes below the social aspiration level have no effect on the probability of change-the curve is horizontal below zero. Another difference is that the coefficient of local market changes is zero. Most likely this is caused by the correlation of density and local market changes, as all partitioned events have significant coefficients for one of these two variables, but none have for both. Station changes have large and significant coefficients for all partitioned events. For innovative formats, the social aspiration level does not seem to affect the probability of change. Performance increases over the historical aspiration levels greatly reduce the probability of change, while performance decreases below the historical aspiration level seem to have no effect. The apparent pattern is one of stable and high probability of change at any performance below the historical aspiration level and rapid reduction once performance is above the historical aspiration level. The change in slope at the aspiration level is significant and large. These results suggest a strong status quo effect for innovative formats. As the most risky form of change, it occurs in stations doing worse than they have before and, hence, making decisions in a loss-framed situation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For satellite entry, performance changes affect the probability of change both above and below the social aspiration level. There appears to be a change in slope at the aspiration level point, but it is not significant. The effect of the historical aspiration level is small and only significant below zero. These results are very different from those of innovative change. Satellite changes save operating expenses and give a format new for the station, but one well tested by the satellite service. Shortfalls relative to the social aspiration level seem to lead to this event, which has lower risk and is more oriented toward cost cutting. For production changes, there is a strong reduction in the probability of change when performance increases above both aspiration levels and no significant change below the aspiration levels. The change in slope is significant for both aspiration levels, but only at the .10 level for the social aspiration level. Success on any performance measure quickly reduces the probability of a pure production change, while any performance in the failure range gives roughly the same probability of change.
Graphic analysis can show the relations more clearly. Innovative, satellite entry, and production changes have roughly equal frequencies (though satellite is most frequent), so the effects of the historical aspiration level can be graphed on the same scale, as in figure 4. Comparison of the curves suggests that the differences in risk level have an impact on the effect of performance feedback. Innovative changes show a strong status quo effect in which performance above the station's own previous performance greatly decreases the probability of high-risk format adoptions. The probability of satellite change decreases gradually across the range of performance changes. Since this outcome has more events than the others, direct comparison of the slopes in the figure overstates the responsiveness to performance for satellite changes. Surprisingly, production changes show nearly the same responsiveness as innovative changes, though they were not categorized as high risk a priori. Production changes do have strong effects on the internal operations of the organizations, like satellite changes do, because a staff of announcers is needed for live production but not for satellite transmission or for one of a pair of simulcasting stations. Unlike satellite changes, which also change the format, pure production changes are harder to justify as a response to market pressures, and hence this change may be preceded by more internal conflict. Of the production changes, 81 percent were from live to satellite (66 percent) or simulcast (15 percent), 6 percent were from simulcast or satellite to live production, and the rest were from satellite to simulcast or from simulcast to satellite, so most of them involved staff cuts. Table 4 shows models with the market and station changes, but not the performance variables, to test whether omitting performance variables will inflate the estimates of the change coefficients. The table shows that the coefficients on local market changes were practically unchanged when the performance measures were dropped. The coefficients for station changes increased for all outcomes, as would be expected if some of the momentum effect were the result of performance feedback. Hence, there is some support for the idea that momentum can be explained by performance feed-78/ASQ, March 1998 Perfomance -Aspiration back, but there is also momentum unexplained by performance feedback. The estimates of nonlocal station and market changes were unaffected by omitting the performance variables.
I did additional analyses to test the sensitivity of the estimates to changes in assumptions. The station and corporate change variables used in the displayed models counted events over two years, but I also estimated models that counted events over one to four years. Each year added required omitting one more year of observations, so these were done on different size datasets. The estimates of the DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS The analysis shows that format change decisions were guided by performance relative to social and historical aspiration levels, opportunities presented by market dynamics, and momentum through prior format changes. These effects were all significant when entered simultaneously into the model. Although the momentum effect was partly explained by performance feedback, it remained even when relative performance was controlled for. The effects of the social and historical aspiration levels did not change when variables for market dynamics and momentum were included. The analysis clearly shows that risky organizational changes are taken when motivation, opportunity, and capabilities are present.
The results on aspiration levels may be the most important contribution of this paper. The analysis showed that aspiration levels matter and gave preliminary evidence on the functional form of the relation of performance to probability of organizational change. For both social and historical aspiration levels, the form of the relation showed the expected decline in probability of change above the aspiration level and for some outcomes below it. The support for the decline in the probability of change as performance increases is perhaps more reassuring than surprising. Internal performance measures may lead to less response to performance feedback overall, which in an analysis like this would result in low change activity overall and to performance having little power to predict the probability of change. Instead, the internal politics of the top leaders of the firm may become more important in themselves and as a moderator of the effect of performance. A likely suggestion is that firms with cohesive top leadership will be unresponsive to low performance, while firms with fractured top leadership will be responsive (Ocasio, 1994 (Ocasio, , 1995 . This leads to a limitation on the generalizibility of the results: the effects of performance feedback may be moderated by the internal politics of the organization, especially if the performance measure is constructed internally.
While the above limitation is important, stock prices are an external performance measure that managers of joint stock corporations pay attention to. Whether stock prices predict changes is less clear when the corporation has a number of places to make organizational changes, such as in the different divisions of a conglomerate, and the difficulty of attributing the performance feedback to specific parts of the organization may contribute to inertia for such corporations. Organizational change is easier in the parts of the organization close to the perceived problem (Cyert and March, 1963), so inertia may result when a problem has no well-defined organizational location. This further limits the generalizibility of the results: the effect of performance feedback is likely weaker when the correspondence between the performance measure and specific organizational changes is ambiguous. The importance of this limitation is well illustrated by the fact that the lower responsiveness of complex organizations is given as one reason why the simplified, de-conglomerated corporation is becoming a highly legitimate organizational form (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994). The results suggest that decision makers have well-defined rules for responding to performance feedback, and these rules are similar to rules that produce adaptive behaviors in simulations (March, 1988) . Where is the inertia, then? First, although the probability of change adjusts according to an adaptive rule, it is not high under any circumstance. Figure 3 shows a maximum probability of change of .157 for a station with performance two standard deviations below the social aspiration levels. The probability increases when the station has experienced or observed change, however, as it jumps to .22 with one station change event in the previous two years and crawls up about .01 for every two changes done by other stations in the market. Limitations in organizational opportunities and capabilities of change are important for these radio stations, just as the theory explains inertia by problems of finding opportunities and lack of change routines (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Second, the decreased sensitivity to performance decrements below the aspiration level is also a form of inertia, since failure increases the probability of change much more slowly than success decreases it. Inertia is not the only puzzle in the study of the effect of performance feedback on organizational change. It was also not expected that some organizations would make changes even when performing highly, though such changes were likely to reduce performance (March, 1981). As the relations of relative performance to change estimated here suggest, some stations performing well above their aspiration levels changed their formats. This cannot be completely explained by a theory of change as a response to social or historical aspiration levels, as there seems to be no reason for the probability of change not to drop to zero when the organization is performing highly. Perhaps social and historical aspiration levels are not the only goals that can be active in an organization. Upward-striving goals can also be activated, leading to high risk taking, even for organizations that are doing better than expected and better than their peers. The most important argument made here is that risk taking is guided by the performance relative to the goal currently active in the organization. The second is that historical and social aspirations have high predictive power and, hence, are likely to be active for many organizations much of the time. Third, since some behavior occurs that would be difficult to explain only by these aspiration levels, other change mechanisms may be in place, such as attention to higher goals, slack search, or proactive change in response to anticipated changes in market demand. The aspiration-level learning theory that these hypotheses were drawn from is an outgrowth of the behavioral theory of firms (Cyert and March, 1963) and, as such, has its propositions phrased at the organizational level of analysis. An organization learns when its experience results in behavioral changes. Market position changes caused by performance shortfalls are clear evidence that learning models have predictive power when applied to risk-taking behavior and suggest that aspiration-level learning should get much more empirical attention. The main alternatives to learning models are models based on foresight, but such models suffer from conceptual and empirical problems. First, if managers' perceptions of their environment are formed by their experience, models of foresight that take the perception formation into account may differ little from learning models. Second, models based on foresight offer predictions that are much more weakly linked to observables than learning models, as the expectations of future payoffs thought to guide managerial action in such models are not easily accessible to the researcher. A learning model based on performance feedback judged against social and historical aspiration levels can be tested easily, as this paper shows. Its predictions are consistent with observed behavior, including forms of risk-taking behavior that models of foresight cannot easily explain, such as the importance of historical performance in determining future risk taking and the near-horizontal relation of performance to risk taking below the aspiration level. Aspiration-level learning is not just an alternative to models based on foresight, it is a more promising foundation for future research.
